Category Archives: Authentication

AS6810 – Requirements for Accreditation Bodies when Accrediting Test Laboratories Performing Detection of Suspect/Counterfeit in Accordance with AS6171 General Requirements and the Associated Test Methods

The following document has been released …

AS6810 – Requirements for Accreditation Bodies when Accrediting Test Laboratories Performing Detection of Suspect/Counterfeit in Accordance with AS6171 General Requirements and the Associated Test Methods

More @ SAE

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Technical Program Announced – CALCE/SMTA Symposium on Counterfeit Parts and Materials

Technical Symposium and Expo: June 26-28, 2018
Workshops: June 28, 2018
College Park Marriott Hotel & Conference Center
College Park, MD

Technical session topics include:

  • What is being Counterfeited – Within and Beyond electronics?
  • Are the Standards Adequate to Protect You?
  • Panel Discussion – Challenges with AS671 Accreditation–Can it Handle Obsolete Parts?
  • Technological Solutions: Tagging, Tracing, Authenticating
  • How the US Government Agencies are Reacting
  • How to Detect Counterfeit Parts with Confidence
  • Bringing Information Security in the Solution Space
  • Impacts on Industry and Society

More at SMTA
 

Thoughts on Improvements to DFARS 252.246-7007 and 7008

Recent discussions with Industry and US Government subject matter experts identify a few areas where new regulations could be improved. Here are what I consider to be the more important areas to address.  Continue reading

Recent DoD Adoption Notices (AS6171 and AS6496)

On 28 March 2017, the following standards were adopted by DoD (Adopting Activity: DLA Land and Maritime) …

  • SAE AS6171, “Test Method Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts”
  • SAE AS6496, “Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronics Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition – Authorized/Franchised Distribution”

SAE International Aerospace Standard AS6171 released

The following documents were released 30 Oct 2016…

  • AS6171 Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts
  • AS6171/1 Suspect/Counterfeit Test Evaluation Method
  • AS6171/2 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by External Visual Inspection, Remarking and Resurfacing, and Surface Texture Analysis Test Methods
  • AS6171/3 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by X-ray Fluorescence Test Methods
  • AS6171/4 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Delid/Decapsulation Physical Analysis Test Methods
  • AS6171/5 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Radiological Test Methods
  • AS6171/6 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Acoustic Microscopy (AM) Test Methods
  • AS6171/7 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Electrical Test Methods
  • AS6171/8 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Raman Spectroscopy Test Methods
  • AS6171/9 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) Test Methods
  • AS6171/10 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) Test Methods
  • AS6171/11 Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Design Recovery Test Methods

Counterfeit IC image repository at Counterfeit-IC.org

I received the following announcement this afternoon and thought it would be of interest to the readers of this blog… Continue reading

GSA Issues RFI For Solution to Tackle Counterfeit IT Products in Federal Supply Chain

The U.S. General Services Administration announced early last week it looking for a supply chain solution as part of a pilot program aimed at helping federal procurement professionals authenticate IT and communication products in the government’s supply chain. …

More at Spendmatters.com

Counterfeit IC threat evolves with spread of clone parts – Military Embedded Systems

“The better government and industry get at detecting counterfeit parts, the better counterfeiters get at fooling detection techniques, especially today with remanufactured or cloned parts adding to the threat….”

More at Military Embedded Systems.

And More on The Role of Traceability and Inspections, Tests and Other Methods in Counterfeit Electronic Part Avoidance (Part 3)

A reader of this blog approached me with an excellent question about my 24 March post More On The Role Of Traceability And Inspections, Tests And Other Methods In Counterfeit Electronic Part Avoidance. In this post, I stated that an organization could “(c) apply inspections, tests and other methods designed to intercept and avoid the use of counterfeits when unable to confirm traceability to the OCM or the OCM’s authorized distributors.” The reader, however, cannot find support for that contingency in DFARS 252.246-7007. I wish to share my response ….

Continue reading

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