In its markup for the FY2015 NDAA, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to provide a briefing to HASC by December 1, 2014, assessing the approaches currently taken to mitigate counterfeit parts in the supply system. …
DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE
(Pages 60 and 61)
TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Assessment of Counterfeit Detection Efforts
The committee recognizes the challenges posed to the Department of Defense in identifying and mitigating the presence of counterfeit parts in its supply chain. Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) was an important step in establishing policy, guidance, and compliance reporting to move the Department forward in addressing the detection and mitigation of counterfeit parts, including microelectronics. The committee believes that it is important to take stock of the actions that have been taken to date and to evaluate their effectiveness.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by December 1, 2014, assessing the approaches currently taken to mitigate counterfeit parts in the supply system. The briefing should include the following:
(1) A cost benefit assessment of current compliance and technology measures for mitigating counterfeit parts, including microelectronics, in the supply chain, and requirements for deoxyribonucleic acid authentication marking. This assessment should include costs associated with program implementation and the scope of components that are being addressed by these measures;
(2) An assessment of the costs and benefits of expanding these measures to additional classes of technology, which have been deemed at high risk for counterfeiting;
(3) An analysis of the quantity of alerts and problem advisories reporting counterfeit electronic parts in the Government Industry Data Exchange Program since January 2011 that were a result of the use of the measures described in item (1) above; and
(4) A description and analysis of the Department of Defense’s efforts to collaborate and coordinate with the defense industrial base on the development of standards associated with the prevention, detection, and responses to the threat of counterfeit electronic parts in the military supply system.