U.S. Government policies and practices should emphasize the importance of procurement practices and product traceability over individual component verification and detection methods. Since the evidence suggests that counterfeit parts enter the supply chain via purchases made from independent distributors and brokers, electronic parts should be purchased, where possible, directly from the original manufacturer, or from a distributor, reseller or aftermarket supplier that is franchised or authorized by the original manufacturer.
It has been represented that some U.S. Government and industry organizations are constrained in their ability to 1) apply a preference for procurement from Original Component Manufacturer or their authorized/franchised distributors and 2) apply counterfeiting countermeasures when procuring from Independent Distributors. We are also aware of conflicting interpretations on whether or not CICA or FAR Part 6 permits the Government to exclude bidders who are not the Original Component Manufacturer or its authorized or franchised distributors from offering components. These interpretations persist despite the introduction of Section 818 of the FY2012 NDAA. If CICA and FAR Part 6 are interpreted such that procurement activities are constrained from excluding bidders who are not the Original Component Manufacturer or its authorized or franchised distributors from offering components, then these organizations will be encumbered in their ability to limit procurements to those component suppliers best prepared to combat the counterfeit electronic components issue.
The U.S. Government should amend FAR 6.302 and DFARS 206.302 to permit the government to: