I recently received correspondence from an A&D contractor representative who observes “there seems to be little published about what suppliers have/are doing with material they already have.” Continue reading
Here is a discussion that those working on SAE counterfeit prevention related standards should learn from.
From the AS9100 and Aerospace Quality LinkedIn group …
“AS9100C and Beyond – Where’s the SPACE Part?“
“… examples of how space and defense are being shoved aside …”
Last month, I posted a gap analysis I performed concerning counterfeit parts avoidance and detection standards. I updated this gap analysis to correct an error on my part; I misinterpreted note 3 on page 7 within IEC/TS 62668-1.
The comment within the gap analysis table about AS5553A superseding IEC/TS 62668-1 was incorrect. It has come to my attention that IEC does not plan to supersede IEC/TS-62668-1 with AS5553A or otherwise adopt AS5553A. Furthermore other additional IEC documents are being developed.
A high level counterfeit prevention strategy is needed to address standards gaps and to resolve implementation issues that, to some degree, are driven by new and forthcoming US Government requirements directed to the aerospace and defense (A&D) Contractor Industry. Collaboration between A&D Contractor Industry companies is key to developing such a strategy, focusing limited resources and driving meaningful implementation at appropriate levels within the supply chain.
I offer the following thoughts on focus areas to include in a high level counterfeit prevention strategy developed from the perspective of A&D contractors.
Legislation and regulatory requirements and standards gaps continue to present aerospace & defense industry and US government users with significant implementation challenges with respect to counterfeit part avoidance and detection. The counterfeit parts issue is similar to the lead-free electronics issue in that regulations drive the need for standards, but technical challenges and supply chain limitations must be recognized so that reasonable and implementable regulations and policies are developed in response to the threat. Though many of these challenges have been discussed in Industry and Government forums and described in trade literature and the media, many remain unresolved.
Some my colleagues recently expressed interest in a gap analysis I performed concerning counterfeit parts avoidance and detection standards. I initially prepared this gap analysis in 2009 (after the release of AS5553) and recently updated it to include new SAE documents and to remove others that are now obsolete.
Here are my observations from this gap analysis …
An excellent history lesson ….
My favorite passage is….
“It is almost amusing to note how within a few short weeks of publication of ISO 9001:2000 there were suddenly so many experts on the subject. (In fact, one could get a real belly laugh from all the “experts” who had qualifications on the DRAFT versions of the standard, which were not even auditable!) The truth is, these “Sudden Experts” did nothing more than what the non-expert does: they read the books.”
Here is an interesting opinion piece on the AS9100 certification scheme’s vulnerability to “anyone with enough electricity to run a dot matrix printer”. An important lesson for developing certification schemes to prevent ‘counterfeit certifications’ to counterfeit prevention standards …
Earlier this year, I posted an entry discussing the compelling need for Quality Management System Standards to embrace key tenets of counterfeit parts avoidance and detection. In its April 2012 newsletter, the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG) discusses its score card for 2011 and priorities for 2012. I am pleased to see that “counterfeit parts” appears at #2 on the list of priorities for 2012 within the IAQC score card for “Requirements” (see page 2). I anxiously await the IAQG’s plan specific to counterfeit parts and actions to initiate definitive steps to embed counterfeit avoidance elements into QMS standards and supplier certification programs.